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STANDARD CLAUSES IN
STATE-TRIBAL AGREEMENTS:
THE NAVAJO NATION EXPERIENCE

Paul Spruhan*
INTRODUCTION

This article discusses the attempts by the Navajo Nation (Nation) and the
surrounding states to create standard contract clauses. The Nation has numerous
agreements with state governments and their political subdivisions. Sovereignty issues
complicate the contracting process, as the Nation and the states have legislativelymandated contract clauses that they each must include in their agreements. Further,
dispute resolution issues have caused friction, as the parties each possess sovereign
immunity unless properly waived. Until recently, the Navajo Department of Justice and
the respective attorney general offices have negotiated solutions to these problems on a
contract-by-contract basis, resulting in varied approaches depending on the type of
agreement and attorneys involved.
In an attempt to resolve these issues, the Nation and the states of Arizona and New
Mexico recently have approved standard contract clauses for certain types of agreements.
Though all issues have not been resolved by these clauses, and it remains to be seen how
such clauses will be implemented, the standard contract clause model can be useful to
other tribes and states who seek efficient and consistent methods of contracting without
sacrificing core principles of tribal and state sovereignty.
THE CURRENT NAVAJO NATION-STATE RELATIONSHIP

Despite the historical depiction of states as the "deadliest enemies" of tribes, the

* Assistant Attorney General, Human Services and Government, Navajo Nation Department of Justice.
A.B., A.M., University of Chicago; J.D., University of New Mexico. Thank you to Professors R. Hokulei
Lindsey and Aliza Organick and to the Tulsa Law Review for the opportunity to present this article. Thanks
and love to Bidtah Becker and to Bahe and Tazbah Spruhan for inspiring my work for the Navajo Nation and
for providing me the support to write this article.
1. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) ("Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the
states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies."). Sam Deloria has been particularly influential,
being among the first advocates, and remaining one of the strongest continuing advocates for a more
cooperative vision of the tribal-state relationship. See, e.g, P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence, Negotiating
Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the
Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365, 382 (1994) (stating that "there is room-abundant room-for tribal negotiations
with the states in areas where local concerns control and where federal law does not specifically forbid local
attempts to solve the problem."). The continuation of the "deadliest enemies" conception of tribal-state
relations has been strongly criticized, with commentators encouraging a different view of tribal-state relations
through cooperative agreements. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the "Deadliest Enemies" Model of
State-Tribal Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73, 74 (2007).
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modern relationship between the Navajo Nation and the states is much more complex.
Three states lie within the boundaries of the Navajo Nation: Arizona, New Mexico, and
Utah. Within those states, the Nation's territory overlaps with ten counties.2 Citizens of
the Navajo Nation have state-issued driver's licenses, birth certificates, and license
plates. The Nation pays into state unemployment programs for its governmental
employees. Its citizens receive state-issued Medicaid and other benefits. Roads through
the Nation were built and continue to be maintained by state or county governments
through the Nation's consent to rights-of-way issued by the United States. 3 School
districts organized under state law operate schools under leases from the Nation. The
Nation's citizens vote in county and states elections, sit on county commissions, and
serve in state legislatures. Two Navajos currently serve as county sheriffs in counties
overlapping the Nation's territory. 4 Most importantly for purposes of this article, the
Nation and the states have numerous agreements related to funding as well as a broad
spectrum of other areas, including health and social services, law enforcement,
education, and public transit.
Though there are many areas of cooperation, there are also areas of conflict,
involving competing claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction. The Nation strongly asserts
its territorial sovereignty and the necessity of state actors to adhere to the Nation's laws
while operating within the Nation. The Nation resists state and county law enforcement
presence within the Nation absent approved cross-commission or mutual aid
agreements. 5 The Nation continues to apply its employment laws to state schools, even
in the face of federal challenges by those school districts that such laws cannot apply to
state entities.6 The Nation insists on provisions in leases and rights-of-way
acknowledging and consenting to tribal jurisdiction, even in the face of objections by
state or county officials.
The Nation's main question in contract negotiation between itself and the states, is
how to balance cooperation and access to state resources while maintaining a respect for
the Nation's sovereignty. That question has driven the desire for standard clauses in the
myriad of agreements between the signatory governments. By "standard clauses," I mean
uniform clauses in agreements across subject matter that can be applied without
2. The Navajo Nation's main reservation, tribal trust and allotted lands, and its satellite reservations for the
Ramah, Alamo, and To'hajiillee bands, collectively lie within the boundaries of the Counties of Apache,
Coconino, and Navalo in Arizona, the Counties of Bernalillo, Cibola, McKinley, Sandoval, San Juan, and
Socorro in New Mexico, and San Juan County in Utah.
3. E.g., Highways 160 and 264 are on the Arizona side of the Nation and Highway 491 is on the New
Mexico side. DISCOVER NAVAJO, http://discovernavajo.com/images/Navajomapjpg (last visited February 17,
2012).
4. The current McKinley County, New Mexico sheriff, Felix Begay, and the current Apache County,
Arizona sheriff, Joseph Dedman, are both Navajo.
5. See State v. Harrison, 2010-NMSC-038, 148 N.M. 500, 238 P.3d 869 (New Mexico Supreme Court
case in which Navajo Nation unsuccessfully argued that county deputy lacked jurisdiction to search Navajo
member after stop within Navajo Nation for alleged crime committed outside Nation); Navalo Nation CrossCommission Agreements Act of 2010, 17 N.N.C. § 1820, as amended by Navajo Nation Council Legislation
No. CD-56-10 (2010) (a provision passed in response to Harrisonthat requires state, county, and municipal
law enforcement to have duly-approved cross-commission agreement in order to validly search or arrest an
Indian within the Navalo Nation).
6. See Red Mesa Unified Sch. Dist. v. Yellowhair, No. CV-09-8071-PCT-PGR, 2010 WL 3855183 (D.
Ariz. Sep. 28, 2010) (holding that the Navajo Nation lacks jurisdiction to apply the Navajo Preference in
Employment Act to Arizona state-organized school districts).
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negotiation in individual situations. The Nation and the states have sought such clauses
for years, and recently have agreed to some standard clauses for funding and crosscommission agreements. The Nation and the states continue to work on standard clauses
for other types of agreements, including for future rights-of-way. The following is a
review of the most problematic clauses in funding and cross-commission agreements,
and the recent attempts to resolve them.
FUNDING AGREEMENTS

Funding agreements span many different types of programs, and involve many
different departments within both the Nation and the states. Most agreements involve
state funding of tribal programs, though the Nation provides funding such as JohnsonO'Malley educational funding, to some state entities.7 Though the legal language in such
agreements is negotiated primarily by the state attorney general's office and the Navajo
Nation Department of Justice, the agreements themselves are initiated and implemented
by different state and tribal programs, involving numerous officials from both
governments. Some money comes from state legislative appropriations, while other
money comes from pass-through funds originating from the federal government.8
Regardless, state funding comes with specific contractual responsibilities, including
adherence to clauses mandated by the state legislature, the state's lawyers, or the state
risk management department. 9 Equally so, the Nation's Council mandates certain
contract clauses, as do the Nation's lawyers and risk management department.10
Potential conflict between the requirements of the state and the Navajo Nation arises in
several key areas of any proposed agreement.
Dispute resolution is perhaps the most contentious subject of any funding
agreement. For example, when the state provides money to the Nation, the state has an
interest in making sure it can recoup money spent inconsistent with the agreement's
requirements. This is especially so when federal funds pass through the state to the
Nation, since the state continues to have fiscal responsibilities under its own funding
agreement with the United States. Sovereign immunity is the main driver of the conflict,
as both the state and the Nation have sovereign immunity from suit unless properly
waived. 1 Under Navajo Nation law, the Nation cannot waive its sovereign immunity in
contracts unless approved by a two-thirds vote of the Navajo Nation Council.12 As a
practical matter, seeking such waiver can take more time than allowable under funding
7. The Nation also has arrangements with several state public law schools, including the University of
New Mexico and Arizona State University, to provide scholarships for citizens of the Navajo Nation.
8. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §5311 (b)(2)(C)(i) (2011) (federal public transit grant program that require states to
distribute money to Indian reservations).
9. One interesting clause in Arizona state contracts requires the contractor to acknowledge that it has no
"scrutinized business operations" in Sudan and Iran. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-391.06 (West 2011)
(Sudan), and ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 35-393.06 (West 2011) (Iran).
10. See, e.g., 2 N.N.C. § 223(A) (requiring a clause in all Navajo Nation contracts that involve expending
funds stating that the Nation's liability is "contingent upon the availability of appropriations by the Navajo
Nation Council"); 15 N.N.C. § 609(A) (2005) (requiring a clause stating that the Navajo Preference in
Employment Act applies to all agreements to be performed within a tribe's territory).
I1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (recognizing state sovereign immunity); Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg.
Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (upholding tribal sovereign immunity).
12. 2 N.N.C. §223(C) (2005).
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deadlines, 13 and, as a philosophical matter, may be difficult to obtain. The Navajo
Nation Council has revised the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act to allow the Nation to
agree to arbitration and waive immunity for actions to compel arbitration or enforce an
arbitration award. 14 However, such suits must be brought in a Navajo Nation court in
order for the waiver to be effective. 15 Therefore, absent a direct waiver of immunity, the
states have to come to the Nation's court system to compel arbitration or enforce an
award against the Nation. Because the Nation requires any attorney appearing before its
courts to be licensed by the Navajo Nation Bar Association,16 the states must have on
staff, or hire on contract, a Navajo-licensed attorney to file any action against the Nation.
Indemnification clauses are a related problem. As a standard clause matter, the
state governments require any contractor to indemnify the state for any claim made
against it arising from the contract. These clauses vary in the scope of the
indemnification, but uniformly require some promise by the contractor to reimburse the
state for legal costs for the defense of the claim and damages if a judgment is rendered, if
the claim arose from actions of the contractor.17 This means that the Nation would agree
by contract to potentially pay the state for claims made by a third-party in an Arizona
court. The Navajo Department of Justice generally takes the position that the Nation
cannot indemnify outside entities, because indemnification is inconsistent with the
Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act. 18 That act defines the scope of the Nation's waiver of
immunity and the procedure to invoke that waiver, and requires the Nation's liability be
established by a Navajo Nation court or an arbitration panel appointed consistent with
the Nation's Arbitration Act. 19 Therefore, according to the nation, a contractual promise
to be liable to the state outside of those limitations is inconsistent with the Navajo Nation
Council's mandate.
Another area of conflict is the application of state anti-discrimination provisions.
Arizona and New Mexico both require contractors to promise not to discriminate based
on, among other classifications, race or national origin, as required by state laws and
executive orders modeled after Title VI and VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of
1964.20 Further, some pass-through funding agreements include federally-mandated
13. The Navajo legislative process takes time because each proposed piece of legislation first must be
reviewed and voted on by at least two Council committees before it is presented to the full Council. See 2
N.N.C. § 164(A)(9), as amended by Navajo Nation Council Resolution No. CAP-10-11, § 3 (enacted Apr. 21,
2011, to be codified at § 164(A)(9)) (requiring that legislation must be approved by the full Council and must
be heard by at least one standing committee and the Naa'bik'iydti' Committee).
14. See I N.N.C. §§ 554(J), (K), as amended by Navajo Nation Legislation No. CJA-05-07 (January 24,
2007).
15. 1 N.N.C. § 554(K), as amended byNavajo Nation Legislation No. CJA-05-07 (January 24, 2007).
16. See 7 N.N.C. § 606(A) (2005) (civil provision requiring Navajo Nation Bar Association licensure); 17
N.N.C. § 377 (criminal offense for unauthorized practice of law) (2005).
17. The following is one example: "The Navajo Nation hereby agrees to save and hold harmless and
indemnify from loss the State, any of its departments, agencies, officer or employees from any and all cost
and/or damage incurred by any of the above and from other damage to any person or property whatsoever."
Intergovernmental Agreement between the State of Arizona and the Navajo Nation, Att'y Gen. Contract #
P00120090011848, § 1110) (an agreement for pass-through of federal American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act funds for public transit) (on file with author) [hereinafter Att y Gen. Contract].
18. See NAVAJO NATION DEPARTMENT OF JUSTicE, ADVISORY MEMORANDUM No. AM/HSGU 01-2010

(2010) (on file with author) (discussing the Navajo DOJ's position on indemnification clauses).
19. See 1 N.N.C. §§ 551; 554(C), (K) (2005).
20. See, e.g., New Mexico Human Rights Act, N.M. STAT ANN. § 28-1-7 (2004) (prohibiting employment
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clauses promising non-discrimination consistent with Title VI and Title V1l.21 The
Nation has a Navajo Preference in Employment Act (NPEA) and a Navajo Business
Opportunity Act, which mandate Navajo preference in employment and contract
procurement.22 The NPEA explicitly requires a provision mandating application of the
act in all contracts.23 Though Title VII exempts tribes as employers from federal antidiscrimination law,24 state law does not necessarily follow. 25 Finally, in the case of
Arizona, an additional provision mandated by state law requires government contractors
to use the federal "E-Verify" employment system to confirm the U.S. citizenship of all
its employees.26 As an Indian tribe predating the arrival of U.S. sovereignty over its
territory, the Nation objects to confirming the citizenship of its employees, almost all of
whom are citizens of the Navajo Nation. The Nation then seeks to excise such clauses
from its agreements.
The Nation and the states of Arizona and New Mexico have resolved some of these
problematic issues through agreement on standard clauses. For New Mexico, the Nation
and the states only have agreed to an arbitration dispute resolution provision. In that
provision, the Nation and the state agree to a uniform procedure on how to invoke
arbitration, how the arbitrators will be selected, and how and under what rules the
arbitration will be conducted. 2 7 However, the provision does not provide for

discrimination by any employer based on, among other classifications, race and national origin);

OFFICE OF

JANICE BREWER, EXEC. ORDER No. 2009-09: PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN STATE CONTRACTS,
NONDISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT BY GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS (2009),

available at http://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/cdm4/item viewer.php?CISOROOT=/execorders&CISOPTR=680
&CISOBOX 1&REC=3 [hereinafter EXEC. ORDER No. 2009-09] (prohibiting discrimination by government
contractors based on, among other things, race and national origin). There is an ongoing question whether tribal
affiliation, as opposed to Indian status, is "national origin," and therefore whether tribal preference mandates
- such as the one included in the Navajo Preference in Employment Act - are illegal discrimination under
Title VII and equivalent state provisions. See infra note 25 and accompanying text; Dawavendewa v. Salt River
Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 154 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that tribal affiliation
is "national origin" for purposes of Title VII). The holding in Daivavendeiva was rendered unenforceable by a
subsequent ruling, which dismissed the case under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure
to join the Navajo Nation. Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d
1150, 1163 (9th Cir. 2002). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission subsequently filed an action
against Peabody Coal alleging national origin discrimination for following Navajo preference, in which the
Ninth Circuit allowed the Nation to be joined as a defendant in the suit for res judicata purposes. See E.E.O.C.
v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 783 (9th Cir. 2005); E.E.O.C. v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 610 F.3d 1070
(9th Cir. 2010) (opinion on procedural issue in suit by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against
Peabody Coal alleging compliance with Navajo preference in leases with Nation constitutes "national origin"
discrimination). Regardless, the Nation consistently takes the position that Navajo membership is not "national
origin" for purposes of these provisions.
21. See, e.g., Att'y Gen. Contract, supra note 17, § 111(15).
22. See 5N.N.C. §§ 201, et seq.; 15 N.N.C. §§ 601, et seq. (2005).
23. 15 N.N.C. § 609(A) (2005).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1991).
25. Compare Arizona Civil Rights Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461(6)(b)(i) (2010) (exempting tribal
governments from anti-discrimination provisions), and EXEC. ORDER No. 2009-09, supra note 20 (exempting
tribes as employers from anti-discrimination provision for state contracts) iwith New Mexico Human Rights
Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2(A)-(B), 28-1-7 (2007) (prohibiting employment discrimination of
"employers" without explicit exemption of Indian tribes).
26. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-4401 (2008). "E-Verify" is a federal internet-based system operated
by the Department of Homeland Security for employers to confirm employees' eligibility to work legally in the
United States. E-Verify, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/E-Verify (last

updated June 17, 2011).
27. See Standard Arbitration Clause with New Mexico (on file with author).
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enforcement of an award in any court, but states that failure to abide by the award allows
the other party to terminate its obligations under the contract .28 The standard clause with
Arizona sets out the procedures for arbitration, and, consistent with the Nation's
Sovereign Immunity Act, waives immunity only for actions compelling arbitration or
enforcing an award.29 Importantly, that provision specifies what court has jurisdiction, as
Arizona agrees it will file such actions against the Nation in the Nation's courts and the
Nation agrees it will file such actions against the state in Arizona courts. 30
Arizona and the Nation have also agreed to a revised provision on discrimination.
This resolution was aided by Governor Jan Brewer's revision of an executive order
mandating such anti-discrimination language in state contracts. 3 1 In Executive Order No.
2009-09, Governor Brewer exempted tribal governments as employers from the antidiscrimination provisions, in line with the federal exemption for tribes under Title Vll. 32
The revised provision tracks the executive order by stating that "the parties agree to
comply with all applicable state and federal statutes and regulations concerning nondiscrimination practices," but that "[t]his contract is governed by Arizona Executive
Order No. 2009-09."33
Further, Arizona has agreed not to apply the e-verify requirement, interpreting
such requirement consistent with the statutory language to only apply to procurement
contracts. 34 As funding agreements do not go through a bidding procurement process,
the Nation and Arizona agreed that the provision was not applicable to
intergovernmental funding agreements. While these issues have been resolved, other
issues linger. There is no general agreement with either state on indemnification.
Arizona acknowledges the Nation's position that it cannot indemnify, but does not agree
to waive indemnification requirements, leaving the issue for resolution on a contract-bycontract basis.35 Interestingly, New Mexico has agreed in certain contracts to forego an
indemnification clause, and instead includes a provision stating that each government is
liable for the acts and omissions of its employees and agents,36 but has not agreed to a
standard clause for all funding agreements. Further, as a compromise for agreements
from the state to the Nation, the Nation agreed to Arizona law as the choice of law for
such agreements. 3 7 While the Nation would prefer all of its agreements to be interpreted
according to Navajo law, it nonetheless agreed to such provision.
28. Id.
29. Navajo Nation and State of Arizona Contract Provisions, Sovereign Immunity and Dispute Resolution
Provisions, § 6 (on file with author) [hereinafter Contract Provisions].
30. Id.
31. See ExEc. ORDERNo. 2009-09, supra note 20.
32. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1991).
33. Contract Provisions, supra note 29, Addendum Provisions for Arizona States Agencies and Contracts
with the Navalo Nation, § 2 (emphasis added). The addition of the word "applicable" is one of the standard
contract drafting techniques in state and federal funding agreements used to avoid a clear resolution of what
provisions actually will apply to a contract, leaving the issue to a later resolution when and if necessary. Such
temporary resolution may delay the question, but I believe standard clauses that resolve the issue completely
are preferable when the parties are willing and able to agree to them.
34. Id. at Overview,

1; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-4401(D)(1) (2008).

35. ContractProvisions, supra note 29, at Overview, 1.
36. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement between the New Mexico Department of Transportation (NDOT)
and Navajo Nation, § 32 (2009) (on file with author).
37. ContractProvisions, supra note 29, § 5.
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With a standard clause agreement in place for Arizona, the Nation intends to seek
similar agreements with New Mexico and Utah. Time will tell how successful these
agreements will be in streamlining the sometimes tedious and contentious negotiation
process for funding agreements, and whether future state and Nation administrations will
continue to adhere to them.
CROSS-COMMISSION AGREEMENTS

Cross-commission agreements between Nation and state law enforcement present
different challenges. The purpose of these agreements is to strengthen law enforcement
both in state and Nation territory by eliminating jurisdictional impediments to lawful
search and arrest. 38 According to federal law, states lack criminal jurisdiction over
Indians within the Nation, while the Nation generally lacks criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians within the Nation, and over anyone outside its federally-defined "Indian
country." 39 As established by several cases in New Mexico, state and county law
enforcement cannot legally arrest an Indian within the Nation's territory, even after 'hot
pursuit' from state territory into the Nation. 40 The Nation requires states to request
extradition of Indian suspects present within the Nation, 4 1 and the New Mexico courts
and the Ninth Circuit have enforced that requirement.42 Further, on the New Mexico side
of the Nation, lands are "checkerboarded" outside the formal boundary of the Navajo
Reservation between state, tribal, and federal lands, creating doubt whenever a crime
occurs as to whether it is committed in Navajo or state territory. 43 However, as crimes
are committed across territorial boundaries, and can involve both Indians and nonIndians, on-the-ground law enforcement can be hampered significantly by these
limitations.
Cross-commission or mutual aid agreements allow state and county officers to be
commissioned as Nation officers and Nation officers to be commissioned as state or
county officers. 44 When properly commissioned under such agreement, the location of
the crime and the status of the offender are irrelevant; either law enforcement agency
may search and arrest an offender, as an officer or deputy can act under both Navajo and

38. See, e.g., Cross-Commission Agreement between the Navajo Nation and the McKinley County
Sheriffs Office, § I (December 8, 2007) (on file with the Tulsa Law Review) [hereinafter McKinley CrossCommission Agreement] (stating the purpose of the agreement).
39. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 526-527 (1998) (tribal civil and
criminal jurisdiction is limited to lands considered "Indian Country" under 18 U.S.C. § 1151); Solem v.
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 (1984) (stating that states generally lack criminal jurisdiction over Indians within
"Indian country"); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that there is no
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
40. See Benally v. Marcum, 553 P.2d 1270, 1271 (N.M. 1976); City of Farmington v. Benally, 892 P.2d
629, 631 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
41. See 7 N.N.C. § 607; 17 N.N.C. § 1951 (2005).
42. See Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 685-686 (9th Cir. 1969); Benally, 553 P.2d at 127273; Benally, 892 P.2d at 632.
43. See Hydro Res. Inc., v. EPA, 608 F.3d 1131, 1135-36, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing the
"checkerboard" land status in Eastern Navajo Agency and holding that specific non-Indian owned fee parcel
within the boundaries of the political subdivision of the Navalo Nation is not "dependent Indian community"
under the "Indian country" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1151).
44. See, e.g.. McKinley Cross-CommissionAgreement, supra note 38, § VII.
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state law. 4 5 Though such agreements do not grant prosecutorial jurisdiction to the other
government, they do solve on-the-ground search and arrest problems, by immunizing
such actions from challenge by the offender that the search or arrest was done without
legal authority.46 However, as with funding agreements, the negotiation of such
agreements involves several key areas of potential conflict.
Liability is a one major concern. Which government will pay claims when a law
enforcement officer acts under the law of the other government? States and counties
assert that the Nation should cover its officers when acting as commissioned Navajo
officers, and the Nation believes the same should hold for its officers when acting as
state or county officers. 47 Both governments have concerns that their insurers will not
cover claims against officers acting under cross-commissions. Indemnification rears its
head again in this context, as both governments seek indemnification for the acts of the
other law enforcement agency.
Another key issue is hot pursuit and extradition. When state and county officers
stop an Indian offender within the Nation after initially engaging the offender in state
territory, they want to able to immediately remove the offender back to the state. The
Nation's extradition statute provides no hot pursuit exception, but requires state
authorities to request extradition of any Indian located within the Nation.48 Connected to
this issue is what post-arrest procedures should be in place, including whether law
enforcement should transport an Indian or non-Indian offender to a Nation or state jail
after arrest. A related practical question is which agency should be responsible to
transport that offender to the jail, which may be fifty miles or more from the site of the
crime.
The Nation currently has cross-commission agreements with McKinley and
Socorro Counties in New Mexico, a commission agreement with the Arizona
Department of Public Safety, and a mutual aid agreement with Apache County in
Arizona. 49 The Nation and the counties have attempted to resolve these issues through
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Martinez, 112 P.3d 293, 295-96 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding the arrest of
a non-Indian outside of the Navajo Nation by a Navajo Nation officer cross-commissioned by McKinley
County).
47. One alternative currently being explored by the counties is to receive Special Law Enforcement
Commissions (SLECs) from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. See 25 C.F.R. § 12.21(a) (2012) (discussing
commissions). Such commissions authorize outside law enforcement to enforce federal laws within Indian
country pursuant to a deputation agreement. See 25 U.S.C. § 2804(a) (2010). The Nation must consent to such
commission before an agreement may be executed. 25 U.S.C. § 2804(c) (2010). Importantly, if federally
commissioned, county deputies enforcing federal law are covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act for any
actions taken in the scope of their federal commissions. See 25 U.S.C. § 2804(f)(1)(A) (2010). Tribes can also
receive SLECs and the Nation has entered into a deputation agreement with the Bureau of Indian Affairs to
commission its officers and criminal investigators. See 25 C.F.R. § 12.21(a) (2012); Deputation Agreement
between the Navajo and Bureau of Indian Affairs (July 9, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Deputation
Agreement]. Such commissions allow Navajo officers to arrest non-Indians for a federal offense. See id. §§
3(A), 7(A).
48. See 17 N.N.C. § 1951 (2005).
49. Though termed "mutual aid," the agreement with Apache County is essentially a commission
agreement. However, Navajo officers do not need to be commissioned by an agreement with the county to be
empowered to enforce Arizona law, as long as they are certified by the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and
Training Board's certification process. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. 13-3874(A) (1991). The Apache County
agreement explicitly acknowledges this fact, and states that the county's commission of Nation officer is to
"confirm" the pre-existing authority. See, Mutual Aid Agreement between the Navajo Nation and the Apache
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the agreements. For the New Mexico counties, the Nation negotiated with then Governor
Bill Richardson's office for standard language that will apply for any county wishing to
enter into future agreements. The standard language states that each officer remains the
employee of their respective agency, whether acting under Navajo law or state law. 50
Therefore, any liability for the actions of that officer remains the responsibility of his or
her employer agency.51 There is no waiver of either government's sovereign
immunity.52 However, there is a mutual indemnification clause, despite the Nation's
general objection to such clauses. 53 Further, any Indian offender arrested for violations
of Navajo law is to be transported by the agency making the arrest to a Nation jail. 54 Any
non-Indian offender is to be transported to a state jail, unless the victim is Indian, and
then the offender is transferred to federal custody. 55 Indians committing traffic offenses
within the Nation are to be cited into the Nation's courts, while non-Indians are cited into
state court, unless the officer or deputy concludes that the road is under the Nation's
jurisdiction.56 Importantly, the Nation agrees that an Indian arrested after hot pursuit
from state territory will be transferred to state custody, essentially waiving the
extradition requirement in that circumstance. 57 The Apache County mutual aid
agreement resolves these issues in essentially the same way, except that there is no hot
pursuit exception, and Indian offenders regardless of the location of the offense are first
to be transported to a Nation jail and must be extradited according to the Nation's laws. 58
As with funding agreements, cross-commission or mutual agreements are not
perfect from either govermnent's perspective. In negotiation of such agreements,
compromises on both sides were necessary. Negotiations with other counties,
particularly in Arizona, have involved detailed discussion of these issues, especially
liability, and have prevented finalization of agreements. However, once executed, they
do provide practical and legal solutions to recurring problems. Importantly, they do so
with respect for the sovereignty of the Nation and the states.
CONCLUSION

In perhaps no other area is the complexity of modern Indian law and policy more
pronounced than in tribal-state relations, because of the dynamic of two sovereigns with
different histories and sources of govermnental power acting within the same territory.
The modem relationship between the Navajo Nation and the state and county
County Sheriffs Office, at § VII(C) (February 6, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Apache County
Mutual Aid Agreement].
50. See McKinley Cross-CommissionAgreement, supra note 38, § XI.
51. Id
52. Id § XIII.
53. Id.§ XIV.
54. Id § VIII(A).
55. Id § VIII(B). Under the General Crimes Act, the United States has exclusive criminal jurisdiction over
a crime by a non-Indian against an Indian. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1948). An offender may be held by either law
enforcement agency for up to twenty four hours pending a transfer of custody to the other agency. McKinley
Cross-Commission Agreement, supra note 38, §§ VIII(H), (I).
56. McKinley Cross-Commission Agreement, supra note 38, §§ IX(A), (B).
57. Id. §VIII(K).
58. Apache County Mutual Aid Agreement, supra note 49, § XIII.
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governments reflects a careful balance of cooperation and independence. In an underresourced area like the "four corners" region of the Southwest, government-togovernment cooperation is a necessary component of providing governmental services.
No one government can carry the load, due to large distances, minimal infrastructure,
and a limited tax base due to low population and high poverty. Consistent with this
reality, the state, county, and Nation governments have compromised on many issues
towards a common goal of benefitting tribal and non-tribal citizens. However, such
compromises are made in the context of mutual respect for the sovereignty of each
government.
Importantly, the relationship between the Nation and the states is ever-changing.
Incidents not fully anticipated by either side arise that test the strength of the
relationship. Administrations change, and the attitude of the officials in power at any
given time can greatly alter the balance agreed upon by prior officials. In the case of the
Navajo Nation, the standard contract clauses with Arizona were agreed to under Arizona
Attorney General Terry Goddard in 2010.59 With new Attorney General Tom Home in
office, it remains to be seen whether Arizona will continue to adhere to the agreement.
The standard clauses for New Mexico cross-commission agreements were agreed to
under the administration of Governor Bill Richardson. The new administration of
Susanna Martinez may or may not follow them in future agreements. Further, a new,
reduced Navajo Nation Council recently took office,60 and it is unclear whether those
officials will change the policies of the Nation affecting tribal-state relations.
What is the lesson for other tribal governments from the Navajo Nation's
experience? First, standard contract clauses are a worthwhile project, particularly if the
Indian tribe receives substantial state funding through multiple funding agreements or
has law enforcement issues that can be helped through cooperation. There is a lot of time
saved by negotiating across-the-board clauses to be plugged into different contracts,
allowing implementation of the programs to take precedence over piecemeal legal
wrangling. Second, success with such clauses depends on a state or county government
that respects the fundamental premise that tribes are sovereign governments existing
independent of state authority, with legitimate power over their territories. Third, to enter
into agreements with the states, tribes must accept the premise that state and county
governments are part of the overall provision of governmental services to tribal
members, and that working with such governments requires a compromise from a
position of absolute tribal autonomy. A tribe that believes that those governments have
59. See Letter of Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard to Navajo Nation Attorney General Louis
Denetsosie (Aug. 5, 2010) (on file with author). Interestingly, Goddard, a democrat, ran unsuccessfully against
Governor Jan Brewer, a republican and the issuer of the executive order exempting tribes from antidiscrimination contract requirements, the same year he approved the standard contract clauses. See EXEC.
ORDER No. 2009-09, supra note 20; Paul Davenport, Arizona Election Results: Jan Brewer Defeats Terry
GoddardIn 2010 Governor's Race, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/
S1/03/arizona-election-results-governor n 773068.html.
60. The Navajo Nation Council was recently reduced from eighty-eight to twenty-four delegates by an
initiative approved by the Navajo people. 2 N.N.C. § 102(A), as amended by Navajo Nation Council
Legislation No. CAP-10-11, § 3 (enacted Apr. 21, 2011) (implementing the initiative by acknowledging the
reduction of the Council to twenty-four members). See Nelson v. Initiative Comm. to Reduce Navajo Nation
Council, 8 AM. TRIBAL LAW 407 (Nay. Sup. Ct. 2010) (upholding the initiative and ordering election for only
twenty-four delegates).
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no role to play within tribal territory simply should refuse to enter into any agreements. 6 1
However, for tribes that do accept a role for such governments, their leaders need to
think seriously about what contract clauses they will not waive, and what clauses they
are willing to modify or omit from intergovernmental agreements.
Standard clauses are not the answer to all of the problems in provision of
governmental services to Indian people. However, they can be part of the solution by
facilitating cooperation instead of discord among tribal and state governments, while
respecting the sovereignty tribes have fought so hard for throughout United States
history.

61. Some commentators have expressed skepticism in the value of tribal-state agreements to tribes,
suggesting state governments are not necessarily to be trusted based on the history of tribal-state relations. See
Ezra Rosser, Caution, CooperativeAgreements, and the Actual State of Things: A Reply to ProfessorFletcher,
42 TULSA L. REV. 57, 70-73 (2006) (disagreeing with the conception of tribal-state relations expressed by
Professor Matthew Fletcher, supra note 1). The purpose of this article is not to support or reiect cooperative
agreements as a normative question. The reality on the ground for the Navajo Nation is that the Navajo Nation
Council and President have decided as a matter of policy to enter into such agreements. This article is intended
to assist tribes in deciding how to negotiate and implement such agreements once the decision to enter into
such agreements is made.
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